OilRig

๐Ÿ”ด High

Last Updated

Also known as: APT 34, APT34, ATK40, Cobalt Gypsy, COBALT GYPSY, Crambus, Earth Simnavaz, EUROPIUM, Evasive Serpens, G0049, Hazel Sandstorm, Helix Kitten, IRN2, ITG13, OilRig, TA452, Twisted Kitten

OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets.

OilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks attributed to this group primarily rely on social engineering to exploit the human rather than software vulnerabilities; however, on occasion this group has used recently patched vulnerabilities in the delivery phase of their attacks. The lack of software vulnerability exploitation does not necessarily suggest a lack of sophistication, as OilRig has shown maturity in other aspects of their operations. Such maturities involve:

-Organized evasion testing used the during development of their tools. -Use of custom DNS Tunneling protocols for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. -Custom web-shells and backdoors used to persistently access servers.

OilRig relies on stolen account credentials for lateral movement. After OilRig gains access to a system, they use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz, to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system. The group uses these credentials to access and to move laterally to other systems on the network. After obtaining credentials from a system, operators in this group prefer to use tools other than their backdoors to access the compromised systems, such as remote desktop and putty. OilRig also uses phishing sites to harvest credentials to individuals at targeted organizations to gain access to internet accessible resources, such as Outlook Web Access.

Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.

๐ŸŒ Country Iran
๐Ÿ“ Last Updated
โšก Risk Level High
๐ŸŽฏ Incident Type Espionage
๐Ÿงญ ATT&CK G0049
Chemical Energy Engineering Finance Government, Administration Telecoms Other Government Private sector Civil society

Introduction

OilRig is an Iranian threat group operating primarily in the Middle East by targeting organizations in this region that are in a variety of different industries; however, this group has occasionally targeted organizations outside of the Middle East as well. It also appears OilRig carries out supply chain attacks, where the threat group leverages the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. OilRig is an active and organized threat group, which is evident based on their systematic targeting of specific organizations that appear to be carefully chosen for strategic purposes. Attacks attributed to this group primarily rely on social engineering to exploit the human rather than software vulnerabilities; however, on occasion this group has used recently patched vulnerabilities in the delivery phase of their attacks. The lack of software vulnerability exploitation does not necessarily suggest a lack of sophistication, as OilRig has shown maturity in other aspects of their operations. Such maturities involve: -Organized evasion testing used the during development of their tools. -Use of custom DNS Tunneling protocols for command and control (C2) and data exfiltration. -Custom web-shells and backdoors used to persistently access servers. OilRig relies on stolen account credentials for lateral movement. After OilRig gains access to a system, they use credential dumping tools, such as Mimikatz, to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system. The group uses these credentials to access and to move laterally to other systems on the network. After obtaining credentials from a system, operators in this group prefer to use tools other than their backdoors to access the compromised systems, such as remote desktop and putty. OilRig also uses phishing sites to harvest credentials to individuals at targeted organizations to gain access to internet accessible resources, such as Outlook Web Access. Since at least 2014, an Iranian threat group tracked by FireEye as APT34 has conducted reconnaissance aligned with the strategic interests of Iran. The group conducts operations primarily in the Middle East, targeting financial, government, energy, chemical, telecommunications and other industries. Repeated targeting of Middle Eastern financial, energy and government organizations leads FireEye to assess that those sectors are a primary concern of APT34. The use of infrastructure tied to Iranian operations, timing and alignment with the national interests of Iran also lead FireEye to assess that APT34 acts on behalf of the Iranian government.

Activities and Tactics

Targeted Sectors: Chemical, Energy, Engineering, Finance, Government, Administration, Telecoms, Other, Government, Private sector, Civil society

Country of Origin: ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ท Iran

Risk Level: High

Incident Type: Espionage

Suspected Victims: Israel, Kuwait, United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Middle East

Notable Campaigns

  • Outer Space (C0042): Outer Space was a campaign conducted by OilRig throughout 2021 that used the SampleCheck5000 downloader and Solar backdoor to target Israeli organizations.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023)
  • Juicy Mix (C0044): Juicy Mix was a campaign conducted by OilRig throughout 2022 that targeted Israeli organizations with the Mango backdoor.(Citation: ESET OilRig Campaigns Sep 2023)

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

ATT&CK technique IDs (denormalized)

Notable Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

No curated IOCs are currently published for this actor. This section will be updated when stable, attributable indicators are available.

Malware and Tools

  • Backdoor.Oldrea
  • RemoteCMD
  • Remote Utilities
  • RemotePC
  • DesktopNow
  • Xploit

MITRE ATT&CK Software

Attribution and Evidence

Country of Origin: Iran Additional attribution information pending cataloguing.

References

[1] mitre-attack [13] Check Point APT34 April 2021 Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iranโ€™s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021. [14] ClearSky OilRig Jan 2017 ClearSky Cybersecurity. (2017, January 5). Iranian Threat Agent OilRig Delivers Digitally Signed Malware, Impersonates University of Oxford. Retrieved May 3, 2017. [15] Trend Micro Earth Simnavaz October 2024 Fahmy, M. et al. (2024, October 11). Earth Simnavaz (aka APT34) Levies Advanced Cyberattacks Against Middle East. Retrieved November 27, 2024. [16] Palo Alto OilRig May 2016 Falcone, R. and Lee, B.. (2016, May 26). The OilRig Campaign: Attacks on Saudi Arabian Organizations Deliver Helminth Backdoor. Retrieved May 3, 2017. [17] Palo Alto OilRig April 2017 Falcone, R.. (2017, April 27). OilRig Actors Provide a Glimpse into Development and Testing Efforts. Retrieved May 3, 2017. [18] Palo Alto OilRig Oct 2016 Grunzweig, J. and Falcone, R.. (2016, October 4). OilRig Malware Campaign Updates Toolset and Expands Targets. Retrieved May 3, 2017. [19] IBM ZeroCleare Wiper December 2019 Kessem, L. (2019, December 4). New Destructive Wiper ZeroCleare Targets Energy Sector in the Middle East. Retrieved September 4, 2024. [20] Unit 42 QUADAGENT July 2018 Lee, B., Falcone, R. (2018, July 25). OilRig Targets Technology Service Provider and Government Agency with QUADAGENT. Retrieved August 9, 2018. [21] Crowdstrike Helix Kitten Nov 2018 Meyers, A. (2018, November 27). Meet CrowdStrikeโ€™s Adversary of the Month for November: HELIX KITTEN. Retrieved December 18, 2018. [22] Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023 Microsoft . (2023, July 12). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved November 17, 2023. [23] Proofpoint Iranian Aligned Attacks JAN 2020 Proofpoint. (2020, January 10). Iranian State-Sponsored and Aligned Attacks: What You Need to Know and Steps to Protect Yourself. Retrieved January 16, 2025. [24] FireEye APT34 Dec 2017 Sardiwal, M, et al. (2017, December 7). New Targeted Attack in the Middle East by APT34, a Suspected Iranian Threat Group, Using CVE-2017-11882 Exploit. Retrieved December 20, 2017. [25] Secureworks COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile Secureworks. (n.d.). COBALT GYPSY Threat Profile. Retrieved April 14, 2021. [26] Symantec Crambus OCT 2023 Symantec Threat Hunter Team. (2023, October 19). Crambus: New Campaign Targets Middle Eastern Government. Retrieved November 27, 2024. [28] Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017 Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017. [29] Unit42 OilRig Playbook 2023 Unit42. (2016, May 1). Evasive Serpens Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved February 6, 2023.