Introduction
Software supply chain campaign and its unnamed operator, first reported by GitGuardian in September 2025: malicious GitHub Actions workflows named “Github Actions Security” injected into compromised repositories exfiltrated CI/CD secrets, with 3,325 secrets stolen from 817 repositories. In October 2026 OpenSourceMalware reported a renewed wave and a second stage that no longer needs a CI runner: a .vscode/tasks.json launcher with a folderOpen trigger runs a Node.js credential stealer disguised as public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2, installs a cron job polling the operator’s server, and is backed by a fallback workflow. OpenSourceMalware calls this stage a copycat of the DPRK PolinRider technique rather than an extension of it, and ties it to GhostAction through shared server infrastructure. A phishing kit on the lookalike domain my-github.com, harvesting credentials and silently authorizing an OAuth application with repo and workflow scopes, was reported on the same infrastructure.
Activities and Tactics
Information pending cataloguing.
Notable Campaigns
Information pending cataloguing.
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)
Information pending cataloguing.
Notable Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
No curated IOCs are currently published for this actor. This section will be updated when stable, attributable indicators are available.
Malware and Tools
- Back Orifice:
- Back Orifice 2000:
- Ghost:
Attribution and Evidence
Information pending cataloguing.
References
References pending cataloguing.
Recent News
Latest articles from security news feeds mentioning this actor.
- GhostAction Hacking Wave Fizzles, but Attackers Lurk on in GitHub DarkReading — 2026-10-28
- GhostAction Attackers Plant Credential Stealer Disguised as Font in 94 GitHub Repositories The Hacker News — 2026-10-19