COBALT KATANA

Also known as: COBALT KATANA, Cobalt Katana, Hive0081, Hive0081 (IBM), Hunter Serpens, SectorD01, SectorD01 (NHSC), Warlord Kitten, xHunt, xHunt campaign (Palo Alto)

COBALT KATANA has been active since at least March 2018, and it focuses many of its operations on organizations based in or associated with Kuwait. The group has targeted government, logistics, and shipping organizations. The threat actors gain initial access to targets using DNS hijacking, strategic web compromise with SMB forced authentication, and password brute force attacks. COBALT KATANA operates a custom platform referred to as the Sakabota Framework, also referred to as Sakabota Core, with a complimentary set of modular backdoors and accessory tools including Gon, Hisoka, Hisoka Netero, Killua, Diezen, and Eye. The group has implemented DNS tunnelling in its malware and malicious scripts and also operates the HyphenShell web shell to strengthen post-intrusion access. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that COBALT KATANA operates on behalf of Iran, and elements of its operations such as overlapping infrastructure, use of DNS hijacking, implementation of DNS-based C2 channels in malware and web shell security mechanisms suggest connections to COBALT GYPSY and COBALT EDGEWATER.

๐ŸŒ Country ["Iran"]

Introduction

COBALT KATANA has been active since at least March 2018, and it focuses many of its operations on organizations based in or associated with Kuwait. The group has targeted government, logistics, and shipping organizations. The threat actors gain initial access to targets using DNS hijacking, strategic web compromise with SMB forced authentication, and password brute force attacks. COBALT KATANA operates a custom platform referred to as the Sakabota Framework, also referred to as Sakabota Core, with a complimentary set of modular backdoors and accessory tools including Gon, Hisoka, Hisoka Netero, Killua, Diezen, and Eye. The group has implemented DNS tunnelling in its malware and malicious scripts and also operates the HyphenShell web shell to strengthen post-intrusion access. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that COBALT KATANA operates on behalf of Iran, and elements of its operations such as overlapping infrastructure, use of DNS hijacking, implementation of DNS-based C2 channels in malware and web shell security mechanisms suggest connections to COBALT GYPSY and COBALT EDGEWATER.

Activities and Tactics

Country of Origin: ๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ท [โ€œIranโ€]

Notable Campaigns

  • 2018
  • 2018-05
  • 2019-08
  • Newly Discovered Backdoors Using Deleted Email Drafts and DNS Tunneling for Command and Control
  • On May 1 and June 3
  • https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-webshell-xhunt-campaign/
  • https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/more-xhunt-new-powershell-backdoor-blocked-through-dns-tunnel-detection/
  • https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/xhunt-campaign-backdoors/
  • we first saw executables that installed and executed CASHY200 PowerShell scripts

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs)

Information pending cataloguing.

Notable Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

No curated IOCs are currently published for this actor. This section will be updated when stable, attributable indicators are available.

Malware and Tools

  • Backdoor.Oldrea
  • Archelaus Beta
  • Cobalt Strike
  • BumbleBee:
  • CASHY200:
  • EYE:
  • Gon:
  • Hisoka:
  • Killua:
  • Netero:
  • Sakabota:
  • Snugy:
  • TriFive:

Attribution and Evidence

Country of Origin: [โ€œIranโ€] Additional attribution information pending cataloguing.

References

References pending cataloguing.